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EAST AFRICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
BENEFITS, COSTS, PRIORITIES
By Reginald Herbold Green
The proponents of any major economic policy ' 
measure in an underdeveloped economy are under 
an obligation to show how this measure will 
stimulate growth. ^
- Dudley Seers
■ /
(The goal is maximising) development creation 
and minimizing development diversion which 
means diverting development potential to an 
already developed country. . • •
2- F. Andie, S. Andie, D. Dosser
I
The first problem of dealing at all effectively with analysis 
of economic integration in East Africa is the state of the art i.e. 
of economic analysis both theoretical and applied. The'barriers are 
threefold: theoretical inadequacy, empirical paucity, and political
economic unreality.
3Standard "customs union" theory assumes gains result from 
marginal increases in efficiency and scale of production for 
particular products within moderately altered set of national 
and regional structures of production, demand, and international 
trade. Trade diversion from outside economies is classed as a negativ 
result (on global welfare and resource allocation criteria) while 
transitional problems are abstracted from by use of before union 
and well after union two point comparitive static analysis. Rather 
more sophisticated versions do exist but the general principles 
of marginal change, opposition to trade diversion, and under- 
emphasis on institutional and transitional problems remain.
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The theoretical analysis in respect of economic integration 
among developing countries has however improved markedly over the 
past decade - largely it is worth noting from the contributions of 
economists primarily concerned with development and in particular 
with industry, structural change, and economic independence, not 
of international economic theory specialists. In this development 
there are two somewhat disparate strands - modified traditional  ^
and structuralist.
The broadened traditional approach exemplified by Andie and 
Dosser ^ drops the Say’s Law thread of international trade theory 
and treats gains from development diversion to poor countries 
through integration as genuine ones. The structuralist case -ge.g. in Linder and Seers - reaches the same conclusion on the
somewhat different ground that there is no genuine diversion away
from industrial economies as the "import floors" of poor economies
will, even with economic integration, be contained by their
"export celings" and, as argued later in this paper, the latter
are likely to be raised by well designed integration. Thus
improving}not worsening, efficency of world resource allocation
can be expected from closed economic integration of structurally
under-developed (but not of industrial) economies even on the
"diversion" side.
Further, the broadened traditional approach breaks away from
the rather rigid "customs union" mould to consider areas other
than trade and forms other than a total customs union or free
trade area. The goal to be maximised is defined as development
(more appropriately in the case of most such writers, though not
necessarily of countries, growth of gross national product). •
The structuralist approach appears at first sight to have tw7o
strands - industrialisation (e.g. Ewing, La Croix, Seidman and
Green, Urquidi^) and import saving (e.g. Linder, Mikesell"''^).
However, these are interlocking strands - as seen in particular
11in Seers, Griffin and Amin . If structural change is to build up
sectors with high rates of demand growth and of economic "linkage"
(ie.pole de croissance) it must, in most cases, be he^avily
industrialised in orientation. Ultimately this logically leads
to w7orld market oriented industrial exports but in the short run
national and then regional preferential markets are more practicable° good import
Because the capital and intermediate^requirements of rapid economic
growth (especially when it has a large industrial component)
are high, the import capacity constraint imposed by low growth
of traditional exports will not become easier - quite the reverse
12in a majority of cases - and either import induction by de facto 
national rationing of foreign goods and/or broadening independent 
markets by preferential intertrade with similarly placed developing 
economies becomes essential.
Quantitative estimation of economic integration gains and costs
is limited, partial, and often-misleading. Some - e.g. pure trade -
definitions fail to measure net gains (from lower costs or higher
levels of economic activity in the region) at all. Other pieces -
e.g. estimation of the share of costs and benefits for particular 
13services - share the same weakness (do the services cost less 
jointly and if so how much?) and also fail to treat the impact 
of expenditure location on national welfare (e.g. if a service for 
Kenya is performed in London this is clearly seen asnot affecting 
Kenya*s national income as if it is in Kenya - the same principle 
holds true within an economic community). The one systematic overall 
attempt to estimate East African regional and national gains from 
. all integrated economic activity required numerous heroic assumptions 
to arrive at any results.^ Very few such studies exist for other 
economic union ventures (including those among industrial economies) 
so that the methodology and experience needed are not developing 
very rapidly.
Much economic integration theory has been marred as far as 
easy applicability goes by abstraction from political economic 
reality. Political economy is basically about who gets what,where, 
when, why and how. Few areas of economic analysis are less subject 
to abstration from the political content of such issues than 
economic integration. This is even more the case for modern 
structurally underdeveloped economy integration analysis which is 
much more a branch of economic development analysis and programming 
than it is of the-main-body of trade theory." This is new borne 
out by the growing body of writing on economic cooperation in Africa.
•In the East African context it is necessary to.consider economic 
• .integration, -wfti-hin :'a-.framework :including: • :
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a. economic growth, i.e. rate of increase of national output;
16b. structural change, i.e. creation of a more nationally
integrated, complex, and productive economy:
17c. economic independence, i.e. reduction of unilateral
■ dependence on external economic units (public or private);
d. other major national goals which may or may not be 
identical among the polities involved in economic co­
operation and or partial integration e.g. income 
distribution, mode of- production.
Evidently all of these goals are dynamic in the sense of being 
continuing changes over time and political economic in the sense of 
necessarily being of prime concern within the political process, 
however narrowly or broadly defined.
II
Gains from economic integration can be divided into short
and medium and long term. However many previously achieved
medium and long term gains do represent continuing short term
gains and the costs of breakup are always likely to be different from,
and larger than, present gains (or losses). Further embodied past
18gains and losses become very hard to evaluate because they may 
cease to be dependent on the existence of economic integration -
e.g. Nytil and the Uganda sugar industry were heavily dependent 
on the Kenya market in the early 1960's but this is no longer true - 
and because the alternative (e.g. importation from outside source, 
domestic production for national market, alternative economic 
grouping) are difficult to define, much less analyse, except with 
considerable vagueness.
Short term gains for a new economic grouping - including 
expansion in depth or in breadth as exemplified for depth if the 
EAC broadened its common market ambit to cover cereals and for 
breadth if Zambia becomes a member - arise from efficiency via 
reduction of overheads o r •excess’capacity, -efficiency from -closing 
weak units to the benefit of strong, competition, and greater variety 
of local goods. The-first. could'be ' important e,g. 'in- an. EAAC 
-Air-;Zambi'a-merger -or.' a-.-Rvahda- -EAC- trade--agreement- allowing ;Rwarid-a r'st: 
animal vaccine plant to operate.at capacity .to meet EAC economy 
demand- now covered by overseas. imports. The second and. third are
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largely unrealistic - few if any moves towards economic integration 
resulting in significant output or employment losses on 
existing units are politically practicable in Africa while the 
likelihood of intense pi'ice competition is rather low. The last 
may be relevant if the range of new Mlocal" (i.e. regional) goods 
available increases production efficiency (e.g. Tanzanian coal 
for Zambian smelting) or significantly increases consumer 
satisfaction (e.g. broadens the range of food and textile types on 
offer thus reducing pressure for imports). ^
Medium and long term gains are much- more important for both 
existing economic communities (if they are to become relatively 
more important to their members and, in some cases even to survive), 
for expansion measures and for new communities.
A secondary source of long and medium term potential for 
reinforcing growth flows from short term gains in efficiency
e.g. if at the time Zambia joined the EAC she had a coal fired, 
export oriented smelting industry and Tanzania an export oriented 
metallurgical coal industry, the immediate efficiency gains would 
be likely to lead to a growth reinforcement for both industries 
(lower cost of smelting for Zambia and broader base to spread over­
heads for Tanzania increasing export competitiveness and lowering 
marginal cost so as to allow additional linked domestic users to 
operate or expand) but not to any radical alteration in scope or 
development potential.
The primary long term gains are quite different - and much 
less likely to be realised under neo-laissez faire much less under 
neo-laissez faire heavily influenced by national planning on the 
one hand arid foreign investors on the other. They turn on changing 
the structure of production and the basic rate of economic growth 
significantly by: ~ .j- • .. », .
a. making viable units which would not be practicable 
nationally e.g. a plastic raw material complex in 
East. .Africa; ... . ......... . \ :
b. reducing cost for units viable but very high costs
—  ......... on -.a- national market- basis- eig'. an-' integrated iron % •_ .
/V W  A f r i c a ; . . , . <;*
c . ’• through 'a and'b broadening tfie •scope.-’ for viable ' ' * ‘r
..production- by -users of the otherwise unavailable ' * • •’ * •
or high cost goods and services e.g. various
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branches of heavy engineering and metal fabrication 
in East Africa;
d. to the extent that a-b-c effects are planned to fit tog- 
, ether, by reducing the level of imports required
for any given level of national product and raite 
of growth combination thus allowing higher output 
and growth at any given export level, e.g. pump, 
telephone equipment, and internal combustion engine 
industries in East Africa;
e. through broadening the range of viable industries 
increasing the likely range and-level of competitive 
exports to outside countries again easing the foreign 
exchange constraint on growth e.g. a breakthrough into 
plastic products exports flowing from a plastic raw 
material industry and its cost reduction impact on 
fabricators;
f. widening the range of products available and/or 
marketable from fnter-dependent economies within
a full or partial coordinated policy planning frame 
and thus reducing unilateral dependence on external 
suppliers or buyers including suppliers of knowledge 
and technology.
These gains are not limited to industry - they can apply 
to agriculture (although probably only in cases in which comparative 
costs are very different and alternative rural development prospects 
exist in any area disadvantaged by a particular aspect of 
integration), to transport, and to specialist technical services. 
Indeed the last deserves far more attention than it normally 
receives. No East African economy can afford either a sound 
technical - engineering consulting firm or an independent - 
agricultural- technological applied research capacity over a broad 
front. As a result high consultancy fees (often for low quality 
work) and - more critical - a dependence on (often relatively 
inappropriate) foreign knowledge are increasing and increasingly 
worrying aspects of development. A first rate core consulting 
firm and applied research capacity for a selected number of key 
areas might just be within the joint market and financial capacity 
of Kenya-Uganda-Tanzania and would certainly b^ within that of
that trio plus Zambia - Malawi - Madagascar - Mozambique - Rwanda -
Burundi - Ethiopia - Zimbabwe - Mauritius - Somalia - Botswana -
c . 19 Swazi.
The common characteristics of these potential gain areas 
are that all:
a. relate to development by structural rather than marginal 
change;
b. fall into areas which - in East Africa - are of concern 
to, and influenced by, national planning processes;
c. have relatively long (say five to eight year) gestation 
periods before significant gains are likely to be evident;
d. require continued market (and supply) access for 
jiistif ication of initial investment;
e. relate to units of production which are economically, 
politically and psychologically highly desired and 
therefore must be distributed in a manner acceptable 
to all partner states;
f. relate to units of production whose economies of 
location often derive either from government 
incentives or from created and duplicable factors 
(e.g. economies of agglomeration of supply and 
service industries, labour pool, urban infrastructure) 
and therfore can be allocated without destroying the 
potential gains;
g. require planning coordination and positive joint 
decisions to be realised.
• • These characteristics are much less' true of the more immediate 
marginal, and static gains on which traditional customs union 
analysis concentrates. .. Equally, they are less relevant in the . - 
context of a neo-laissez faire national political economic frame.
Ill• t . • •
The political aspect of the political economy of integration 
requires an . examination of the meaning of political economic 
sovereignty- in the- eorttexd" of ••■•rational 'dcbriorn£c:'‘development*' arid 
economic independence. At first glance any very close form of 
economic co-operation or integration would appear to be a 
significant derogation from sovereignty; however on closer 
examination.it appears likely that the operational level o f
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economic sovereignty, development planning, and economic 
independence achievable under partial pooling and acceptance
of specified limits on national and joint action can be
• ■ 20 greater than those available on a national basis.
This conclusion is underlined by the worsening international 
economic climate - the road from UNCTAD I through UNCTAD II through 
the Pearson Report to UNCTAD III is one which has seen rising 
obstacles and declining aid in surmounting them so far as the
21international economic system relates to developing economies.
At Santiago the position of the Group B (industrial capitalist) 
economies and of the Soviet Union was - with a number of 
honourable full or partial exceptions - very close to a root and 
branch rejection not only of Pearsonism but on their own previous 
commitments in principle.
The radical worsening of the international economic situation - 
precipitated and to a significant extent caused by food supply and 
price increase and petroleum price increase shocks - makes 
international and regional action by poor countries even more 
urgent. The 1972-73 commodity boom is in full reverse except 
for temperate foodstuffs and oil, Western industrial economy output 
is stagnant and inflation soaring, competitve import and capital 
flow restricitions are probable. The "Bright New World" so 
glowingly promoted by UNCTAD I and the Pearson Report is dead.
With the Western industrial (and to a lesser extent: the Socialist 
European) economies unwilling and the new oil rich unlikely 
(an any adequate scale) to meet the trade, finance and food flows 
necessary to sustain even the moderate ldc growth dynamic of 
1960-1973, the poor nations must act more collectively and
effectively or accept that most will face .economic stagnation* 22 or decline and many literal starvation.
In the formal sense economic co-operation may not reduce 
the rights inherent in sovereignty and ownership. Even in a 
fairly intensive economic community - e.g. the East African 
Community - there can.be a s.ystem. of national-.veto rights. However,, 
in reality* no'serious- arid sustained' form .of 'co-operation is possible 
■unless a considerable degree of willingness, exists both to seelc out : - 
.’acceptable.compromises and to accept net losses .on individual • . 
joint decisions'without vetoing them (so long as one sees the '
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\the framework as creating the opportunity to achieve larger gains 
on other decisions). The East African Community could hardly 
continue to function were the actual use of veto powers the 
normal end to discussion of any issue on which interests were 
not identical.
Supranationality therefore involves a more complete and 
more formal merging of sovereignty in certain specified fields, 
not a complete change in kind from the realities of effective, 
sustained co-operation. Indeed, even wit'h the veto powers, some' 
sovereignty may be pooled in the sense that unless agreement on 
some course of action can be reached either the status quo' or 
inactivity are the only possible courses of action other than 
withdrawal from cooperative relationship - a number of common 
market provisions of the EAC and the activities of the 
Cooperations are cases in point.
It is therefore idle to deny that supranational institutions
incparticular, and close cooperation in general, do result in a
reduction of effective formal rights to take decisions based on
sovereignty and ownership. The case for arguing that economic
cooperation and economic integration can increase the degree
of economic independence attainable by African states rests on
their ability to increase decision making and implementing
power and capacity by assisting in capturing economies of
23scale, division of labour, and specialisation.
Economic size is crucial to political and economic power 
to bargain and to enforce decisions. (It is not the only factor 
in potential power, much less in utilised power - economic 
independence in Africa is hardly uniquely corellated to economic 
size). The only generally available rapid way to achieve 
quantum changes in economic size is through economic cooperation 
of an intensity approaching economic integration. The potential 
future gains-.are also-, significant because Larger-.economic -.units . .. 
have wider realistic arrays of both strategic and project choices 
'Open, to -'them arid, can' benefit, from, economies ’ of' scale 'even-in'-" '
. sectors '^ and produc.t'iv.e uni£,3;.,viable..on .■ the spal-ler. n a t i o n a l ; - v  
market scale.' • . . . • . :
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Further, economic cooperation should be a means of increasing 
both effective decision making and implementing capacity. Some 
activities can be carried out jointly - e.g. the East African 
Research Institutes and the Community Secretariat. Others will 
benefit from sharing of experience whether in joint action or in
exchange of data and advice in respect of basically national
areas of action - e.g. an exchange of detailed information among 
African states on the negotiation of foreign firm "takeovers" 
and of management agreements could be highly valuable. Finally, 
specialisation of activities can permit a focussing of personnel, 
education, and research development e.g. if industries requiring 
metallurgical engineering talent were largely concentrated in 
Uganda, chemical in Tanzania, and mechanical in Kenya the education 
training, servicing, and research capacities could be more easily 
developed nationally than if the same industries existed with 
smaller units in each of the states.
If gains in terms of power and capacity can be made, then the
ability of each state to exercise rights of sovereignty and 
ownership may well be greater after their partial merger than when 
exercised separately but with weaker power and capacity backing.
To the extent that the dynamic gains from economic integration 
are realised and opportunities for achieving greater economic 
independence are utilised, the effect of economic cooperation on 
the potential for higher levels of economic independence will tend 
to grow over time. This contention is likely to be especially 
valid: because the experience of past experiments in close economic 
cooperation is that succesful operation tends to lead to expanded 
sectors of cooperation and to closer integration of decision 
making and implementing within existing ones.
However, two dangers must be faced. Not all forms of 
economic cooperation are conducive to the promotion of economic 
.. independence..by. all parties, to .the -venture... . Cooperation ..between. . 
tiers monde and industrial economies is very likely to increase 
dependence: and'freeze existing; patterns not the. reverse. .This.'is ' 
probably-,mos-t.;true^of .economic.^int-pgratiqn..or- q.uu'sir^ntegration. 
relationships’ -•most’evidently the .'colonial' relationship’ but also
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at least some elements of the EEC Association arrangements - but
is also an ever present danger in the less*, formalised "special
relationships" whether commercial, capital transfer, or educational/
cultural in content.^
The same result can occur from cooperation with individual
foreign firms - many are economically larger than most of their
25"host" developing economies. It can also arise even among
African states if some partners are very much weaker in terms of
economic capacity and/or power. The Sahel-Benin Entente, at least
potentially, has this danger (because the Ivory Coast is much
stronger economically than its four partners taken together) and
the partial breakup of the Central (Equatorial)African Customs
and Economic Union (UDEAC) flowed to some extent from it.
The second danger is in assuming that minimisation of pooling
or surrender of sovereignty is achieved by cooperation within a
basically laissez faire framework and that such a framework is
consistent with maximising gains of power and capacity. Neither
assumption will bear serious examination - at least in developing
economy context and probably more generally;.
A neo-laissez faire framework does require less joint decisions.
However, by laying down either rules for non-intervention or for
no joint intervention (or both) it maximises conflicts between
national political economic planning and the mechanism of cooperation
Economic community rules designed to ensure "pure" free trade
may hamper regulation of both production and trade in ways which
would serve the interests of the Community and of its members
individually, they may even make impossible steps to ensure net
gains to all members and thus create stresses threatening the
Community’s existence -a situation which clearly did develop
in the unregulated pre-Treaty East African Common Market.
Further, the absence of significant areas of joint planning
will tend to limit the degree to which the joint economic size
of the partners can be brought to bear on problems of external
negotiation, specialisation, and capturing of economies of scale.
Either cut throat competition among the members - often ably
abetted by external "partners" or would be "partners" in particular
projects - or a simple frittering away of potential gains is
2 ^likely to result. No developing area economic community appears
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to have adequate forums for common discussion aimed at achieving 
national decisions to coordinate, much less powers to coordinate, 
national political economic planning and to create a regional 
strategy. The divergence currently lies between those with 
negligible abilities to act in these area - e.g. the Central 
African Economic and Customs Union (UDEAC), and the Latin 
American Free Trade Area (1AFTA) - and those with both some 
coordinative capacity and experience combined with a mutual 
concern'for their expansion - e.g. the East African Community 
and the Andean Pact.
Briefly then, while effective cooperation, especially over 
a broad front and to a high level of intensity, necessarily involves 
a de facto or de jure pooling of certain facets of sovereignty 
and limitations on certain aspects of ownership rights it can- 
especially if the parties are of relatively similar economic 
strength and engage in serious joint or coordinated planning - 
achieve significant increases in power and capacity to take and 
implement decisions. Therefore, it can play - and in the African 
context should play - a major role in the pursuit of higher 
levels of economic independence and of effective national economic 
planning and political sovereignty.
The foregoing analysis suggests several working guidelines for 
the political organisation of economic integration:
a. areas vital to operation of the integration scheme 
should be defined with care and rules for action 
and methods of reaching binding decisions in
' ■ disputes laid down in advance'e.g. the Common
Market sections of the East African Treaty;
b.• areas in which it is hoped speedy progress can 
be made should be identified and a working 
framework for elaboration and development provided 
but left open enough to permit alternative roads _ 
forward e.g. the Economic Consultative and
. -Planning .Council • 'and the-Fiscal Harmonisation • . ■' - •'
"... sections/ of t.he Treaty;-... . • .•.« -: v,-r----.. - .“•'.•v • •••-
'V
- 13 -
c. provision should be made - and put in practice - 
for adding new rules and procedures if these are 
vital to continued effectuve functioning of the
■ joint arrangements e.g. the State Trading rules
adopted by the Common Market Council in 1971;
d. the addition and subtraction of individually 
useful but not critical areas of joint action
or operation in the light of changing circumstances 
should be expected and facilitated e.g. the 
University of East Africa and the East African 
Income Tax administration on the subtraction side 
and the East African Development Bank and the 
Management Training Institute on the addition list;
e. preservation of an ultimate veto power on changes 
seen as conflicting with vital national interests 
should be accepted as a necessary element in having 
any real powers conferred on joint bodies but
its actual use (including pressing an issue to the
point at which another party feels forced to use it)
should be as rare as possible and take place only
after serious attempts to arrive at a mutually
27agreeable solution or package of solutions;
f. forums (formal and informal and at technical, 
official, and public as well as political levels) 
for coordination of action and exchange of 
information on areas formally outside as well as 
those within joint decision taking should be provided 
to avoid unexpected clashes, gain through informal
'•* or speci'al case joint action and pooling of information, 
strengthen the habit of working together, and explore 
possible new areas for formal joint action e.g. the
.   -.East African-.Committee-of-Planners, Treasury » •
consultations on currency parities, East African 
, .-v - v •_ ^ * :e6jnmttn'ffcy' Study. S e i f i i n a t ' s ' ’7- ’" ‘r 'I 
. ;ar.e^ s...pf . basic .;diy.ejqt .-orl^ ndiree't; naCfopaT..:--policy-• w...•
divergence ' should not be brought into.'-’the ambit of ‘ • 
• • • £• V j ' d i n t f .'deVis'-ion;taking' e. g,' .^ i<rett^ 4lff ^ eWt*.a'rid ./;■
- 14 -
mode of production policies. A joint East African 
currency could not endure even if created and it 
is hardly essential - nor even critical - for 
normal commercial transactions;
h. where some aspects of issues involving basic ' 
divergences must be handled jointly, define the 
scope as narrowly as is consistent with efficient 
operation of the areas of joint economic policy and 
• activity e.g. EAC and Corporation wages and
salaries probably must be jointly set but given the 
very different wages and salaries policies of 
Tanzania and Kenya (and to a lesser extent Uganda) 
to seek to broaden the area of joint wage and 
salary determination would be nugatory or 
counterproductive.
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IV
Economic integration is not costless - no serious political 
economic strategies or goals are. However, care must be taken to 
compare the results (evaluate the costs) in contrast with an attain­
able and maintainable alternative situation. In East Africa two 
common errors in cost calculation are to contrast present and/or 
proposed arrangements with: ^
1 . a laissez faire common market (at least for industry) with
free producer choice of location like the pre-1964 East
African Common Market. If this were a viable solution it
would maximise Kenyan and short-though probably not long-term
regional gains. It is not a viable solution because it would
lead - as it did from the 1920's onward - Uganda and
Tanganyika to believe they suffered net losses and - as they
did from 1964 through 1967 - to react by raising ad hoc trade
barriers and de facto plant location controls. Thus to say
the transfer tax hinders trade is true in the abstract but
quite false when compared to the 1967 level (let alone trend)
28of restrictive licensing which was the actual alternative.
2. A planned economic community with each decision taken so as 
to maximise the gains to one state doubtless would be ideal 
for the state deciding (usually the state of the person 
misevaluating costs in this way) but hardly for the region or 
the other states. Its implausibility is evident when stated 
in this form. However, it is the implicit basic used in 
approaching allocation (of industries or institutions) on the 
basis of estimating the loss of not having each separate 
individual unit ( on a national or a regional basis) in ones
• ■•own.”state as opposed to comparing the costs and benefits ■■••• 
of a possible joint location of joint units solution to those 
of a probable actual purely national institution/market outcome.
One evident cq-st'' of -.ecOnomi'e- integration.-'is -.''its ••'staffing and:- .
servicing - at national and regional level - in terms of high level 
.personnel and 'time-’at -least a's'-muph- a*s' of uioney. .Certainly .much, of ■ 
the ..cost j-•'thhughrh^--‘-ai*ly.'V&u]cd'\b'9-vi?ed-ir"ecte^; -to alternative,..,-/ c-’ »' 
national policies. and institutions This implies that if a service 
or’‘.a .policy \is . not. o;re.:.ef.ficlent; (i,ri. "terms "of .cost ’.p'ef ’ unit pf .j. 
service or product produced) regionally it is a waste of "overhead” 
costs to seek to regionalise it or to keep it regionalised - a 
"proliabid’ exarhple '’todAy;'l's ‘''tWe' feal*t;'Affi’can Examinations •’Cbuncii.
and a more striking one was the East African Income Tax service 
once national income distribution strategies and resultant fiscal 
policies - not just rates - differed significantly.
A second cost is loss of speed in decision taking and imple­
menting. To co-ordinate the positions of three states takes 
longer than for one to reach a decision. The Dar and Mombasa Port 
development plans in the present Harbours Corporation development 
plan would be further advanced had the ports been nationally 
administered - a cost to be set against the (probably larger) general 
gains from greater ease in securing finance and spreading overhead 
costs on the combined operation and the special gain arising from 
the fact that Uganda as a landlocked state can most easily and 
effectively participate in harbours policy through a joint corporation, 
a gain which would also apply to several potential members.
A third cost is the need to avoid policy measures which 
whatever their formal legality under integration arrangements - would 
in practice destroy the basis of economic co-operation. For example 
had Kenya (the regional trade surplus partner) devalued in 1967 
without parallel moves by Tanzania and Uganda the entire trade 
balancing fabric of the treaty would have been destroyed by Kenya's 
competitive price gain and the bringing into force and initial 
operation of the Community rendered, at the least, immeasurably 
more difficult and in practice probably impossible.
A fourth cost is the acceptance of policy compromises or partner 
policies which have real costs in terms of ones own goals and policies. 
For example capital account exchange control by Uganda and Tanzania 
has real costs to Kenya as did the (partly related) absence of a 
sales tax in Kenya before 1973 to Uganda and Tanzania. The need to 
maintain a common structure of EAC and Corporation wages and salaries 
geographically and among, institutions poses different costs to Kenya _ 
and Tanzania. The former - with national salary scales above the 
EAC and Corporation ones - faces union pressure for boosts and 
difficulty in ensuring that senior Kenyan personnel seek community 
posts; the latter finds the salary inflation pressures of the much 
higher EAC - Corporation scales (wage scales are in fact not above 
Tanzania ' levels /except-' fbf' sbrni-Skilled -port 'workers' who ard ,- 'on '&■■■ 
skill basis, out of line with the rest of EAC - Corporation wage 
’ "earners'-as • we ll) a-serious corrosive force against its- incomes- 
ppTicy//' This- a s '■ dka'cerbafdd./by;' t’He' 'tendendy-'To-' make dhartgeS: in- huge- w .
e.g. £0-30%.- chunks -which leads to' parallel domestic pressures which 
overlook'.- the 5 - 8',-year-gaps '.between.. the* .c-hanges and .'-cQm.pare.;.'them 
directly with Tanzania's typical annual awards of 5 %  even though over 
•5 ,-. 8. y.ears the. latter exceed the former.*■;!7,-.. -vo.-- W -  V ; . 4-iSr V.;. ■:.fv e '
- JLO -i
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The 1973-74 Turner Committee Report on Community Wages and 
Salaries recommended parallel Community and Corporation scales, 
more frequent and uniform adjustments, abolition of special fringe 
benefits (different from national provisions) with partial 
compensation in basic salaries. It also advised that scales 
(other presumably than those governed by minimum wage legislation) 
be at an agreed "average1' of partner states, not equal to the highest 
nor 1 0 -20% above the highest as had been the "traditional" policy 
which EAC staff wished restored.
Evidently there are limits to the costs of this last type which>•
can be borne. If co-operation in a particular area has very high 
policy costs this may mean that it should not be attempted whatever 
the potential gains. A unitary East African Central Bank is a clear 
case in point, at least on the cost side. In this instance,the 
potential gains may not really be all that great compared with what 
is possible through co-ordination among Central Bank and Treasuries 
plus Treaty rules on exchange control and compulsory loans among 
partner states. National credit and foreign exchange planning 
diverges widely among the partner states. In Tanzania they are now 
integral to the overall planning process and to the central goal of 
transition to socialism and could not be surrendered to an external 
body unless all its members had strategic socio-political goals and 
approaches similar to those of the Arusha Declaration and Mwongozo.
However, some apparently "sensitive" areas can be occasions 
for joint operation if the gains are evidently likely to be high even 
though national policies diverge. Foreign investment and technology 
transfer regulation and control in the Andean Pact seems to be an 
example. The.re the demonstration of the-huge cost of tied purchases,
.• royalties-, • and other fees (totally dwarfing subsidiary local profits) 
has apparently led to at least minimal acceptance or working the 
, regulations by even the more-foreign investor oriented member states.
The number of "no go" areas will depend on how similar the
socio-political goals and strategies, as well as the objective
. structural characteristics, of partner states are. Total.economic
integration is not possible except under conditions which would allow
..tQ.ta.l political integration a-s .w e - H ,... However.,,.even .rather w i d e   •
• • * '  • . . • .. ;
' divergences'do pot prevent partia;i. economic .integration much less more
-limited- cooperation- agreement’s-' scr ‘long as.-’-theS.e ’.identi-fy cor.rectiy'
;<>ajfeas: of -..joint' concern .in .which mut-ual; agteeipenf op-aqtion ..wiil; no t-. ■
pr'ejud-i'ce 'key’riaiioiial''policies I2 9 ‘ The ‘ tnembers’of ’ the Organisation
of Petroleum Exporting Countries operate that body very effectively
..indeed..-jbutvta; prqpp^--a.n:'If aqTIi/a'n .,ecpn.p}9.ic-. ynion;...(:or;. a.;;-Say.di.- 'i-:i«.
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Arabia-Libya one) would clearly be fatuous.
The most relevant rules of thumb in evaluating costs of 
economic integration appear to be three:
1. Be certain the cost is assessed in comparison with a 
genuinely attainable alternative;
2. Evaluate the cost in relation to the benefits expected 
and thus calculate a benefit/cost ratio, however 
approximate;
3. Avoid areas in which costs are not only clearly high but' /
likely to prove open ended and escalating over time (e.g. 
in Central Banking the costs of a single bank now would 
be many times as high as when the issue was actively 
debated in the early 1960s).
V
Evaluation of overall gains (or losses) regionally and 
territorially from the East African Common Market and Common Services 
has always resembled an expedition into a mine field - data were 
scanty and ambiguous, convictions firm and conflicting. Basically 
gains arose from economies of scale and efficiency, e.g. one Customs 
and Excise service versus three and one flexible rolling stock and 
traffic allocation system for the unified railway system, and from 
economies of location, e.g. concentration of sugar production in 
Uganda. Costs arose from location - regionally if siting was altered 
to suit distributional pressures, as in the case of the switch of 
BA'J's main plant from Uganda to Kenya, and nationally if concentration 
in large units meant net movement of production of goods and services 
from one territory to another as in the pre-1968 uniform location of 
all Headquarters in Kenya - and from cross subsidisation if one 
'territory had systematic losses on joint self contained services as 
opposed to profits elsewhere as in the case of the railways portion
of Railways and Harbours where Kenya surpluses covered Uganda and
.30- •- Tanganyika" deficits'.-■ ' '•••<<-•.? •• ;• :• y • .y
The general conclusions of studies on pre-Treaty economic
■ co-operation, ip East Africa were- that modest .regional gains. (l-3?£
'Vpf --Regional ’Prddud-t^ - was .the; ian'g.e, 'U-sual-ly. explicitly1‘dr .Implicitly-.
suggested)' did exist; these arose from common services-as much a’s .
• ’fr o m ltr ’a'de^ ...Kenya '.was' th e  largest.'*g.aiiiex.q ’>. gains-".wgre 'r i s in g  ^Qve^ ' .V • •
time. In Tanzania the general view was that on balance she lost
from the arrangements, a view shared less forcefully in Uganda.
Kenya opinion was that all parties gained though Kenya was 
the largest gainer.
31 32Academic analysis was equally divided. Ghai , Newlyn ,33 34 •Robsen , and Green' concluded Tanzania did lose with Ghai
and Robsen finding a smaller Uganda loss and Newlyn and Green’s
results showing a net gain or loss for Uganda so small as to
be within the error margin of the estimation process used.
35 36Ndegwa and Hazelwood - the latter suprisingly given.his
opposite conclusions in the relatively similar case of Malawi
and Zambia in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nysaland -
concluded that all three territories had net overall gains,
though Ndegwa did at least imply that they were unbalanced
and that larger Uganda and Tanzania shares (out of a growing
total) were politically desirable and economically possible.
All the academic analysts agreed that short term breakup
costs would be high enough to make the immediate results of
collapse of co-operation expensive to all three territorial
economies - a view the successful outcome of the Phillip
commission negotiations suggests the three governments shared.
All also agreed that regional gains could be expanded in
the future in such a way that all three partners benefitted.
The following table summarises the most detailed extant
37study of gains and losses. It is in respect of 1964 - the 
last year before stresses led to the creation of various 
trade barriers. Its preparation required extensive assumptions 
on efficiency and'scale gains and location costs and benefits. 
The general assumption was that the alternative to regional 
production and services wasj national production and services 
not importation. • - •»*'• ' ••• ■ / ••' " " • - '  *
COMBINED STATIC GAINS/LOSSES (£’000)
1964
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Tanzania Kenya Uganda East Africa
I. Common Market - Industrial -4420 9440 -1960 3060
II. Common Market - Agricultural 10 -2560 3940 1390
III. Co-j.mon Market - Invisibles -1730 3610 -1050 830
IV. Common Services 1670 8750 - 470 9950
V. Raisman Transfers 400 - 680 290 10
Total Economic Community Gains/Losses -4070 18560 750 15240
1964 Monetary GDP .170000 213000 141000 523000
°/o Gain/Loss -2.4 8.7 0.5 2.9
7o of Economic Community - Net Gain - 27 122 5 100
2Public Sector 3Common Market -1230 1990 510 1270
Common Services 4210 2560 1060 7830
Raisman Transfers 250 -440 190 -
Total Public Sector 3230 4110 1760 9100
1964 Government Domestic^
Recurrent Revenue 31000 48200 35000 116600
e/Z Public Sector Gains . •
to recurrent revenue 10,4 " 8 .6 5.0 7 .8
Private Sector** . • . . . n - . .. f ... .
Common Market -4910 8500 420 4010
Common Services -2540 6190 -1530 2120
Raisman Transfers . 150.* • •. • -240" '• ' 10.0 10.. . ..... » . • , • /. , • • .
Total Private Sector . -730° 1445.0 - 1 0 1 0• v' A., -f '• * 6140 . _ ..
Source:. Computed' from Nationa Accounts and Government Accounts- Tanzania-,
' ‘. \\.;Kdnya?;;'-Uga'ndayt^ -Xi.^ ;s> o'.V- * r :V • 7. v:
. 1. Rounded' to nearest 10- except GDP nearest 1,000. •
' ■ % .. . Goyernmenf Domestic Recurrent ’.ReVenue'nearest ’TOO’ • • '/ ';*• "
' ' * 2\ Includes • EACS0,' EAR and 'H, ‘'EAP and ’T,' ‘EAA/ UEB-.'""
- 21 -
3. Includes Invisibles.
4. The East African total includes Reisman Formula direct 
payments to EACSO. 1964 estimated by simple averaging 
1963/64 and 1964/65 Fiscal Years.
5. The relevance of this comparison stems from the fact 
that economic union provides net public sector gains 
(including tax receipt gains/losses) of this order 
of magnitude in relation to Central Government 
recurrent receipts. If services were maintained at 
present levels and at present charges on a national 
basis this would have been the order of additional 
effoi't required on recurrent account in the absence 
of Economic Community.
6-. Includes para-statal bodies not listed in 2. Only 
Uganda Development Corporation was - in 1964 - 
significantly involved in economic community activity 
primarily in textile and asbestos product exports.
Even granted the partial statistical data available and the 
rather heroic assumptions necessary - especially on cost savings 
and on common market invisibles in general - the exercise does 
yield results of practical as well as of theoretical interest. 
While more accurate or complete data or moderately altered 
assumptions would change them in degree, radically different 
assumptions would be needed to alter their nature.
1. The overall East African static gain from economic 
community was neither negligible nor as massive as 
often assumed.
2. Common services were the dominant contributors to
net regional gains. However, the centralisation effect
in this sector was such as to make Kenya - not 
Tanzania - the largest gainer, and, probably, to leave 
Uganda a net loser.
3. Common market net regional gains were limited by
the absence of significant number of industries
actually requiring the joint market. As a result 
centralisation in Kenya relocated regional product 
more than it enhanced it. The same held true
♦ ,-'a • fortiori, pf -the.-commercial: and.-f inapcial ..segment! s.* -■
of Common Market invisibles.
''V 4^ "- ,The'"agf icultur'ar'Common Mafket\'Vwhile'-'partial arid
;a-..mxiCh;: lower*', trade .volunje . than:-..the. Industriai?-- .v>. 
’ was "significant for exports from all ’three, states arid 
. the .-source - -of'. Uganda * s.'* main gains 'from.’economic- eomrrruni
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5. The Raisman Formula for fiscal redistribution had 
proven quite inadequate to offset the location of 
income generation effects of economic regionalism.
■ 6 . All three states gained significantly on public sector 
account but only Kenya showed a positive private sector 
balance.
7. Kenya, and especially large segments of her manufacturing, 
agricultural and processsing, and service - commercial 
sectors, benefitted substantially from the economic 
community. For her the 1964 status quo was not only 
viable but highly desirable in economic terms.
8. Uganda had a marginal overall gain dependent on a few 
commodities: textiles, cottonseed oil, tobacco, sugar,
hydro-electric power.
9. Tanzania had a substantial loss concentrated on her 
industrial and service - commercial sectors. However, 
she did have considerable and potentially growing stakes 
in both the Common Market and Common Services.
10. Because the dominant effect of economic community had 
been to centralise rapidly growing manufacturing and 
service activities in Kenya, the dynamic effects of 
East African economic co-operation in its 1964 form 
would not have erased Tanzania’s static loss or 
increased Uganda’s marginal gain. Rather they would, 
by allowing a relatively more rapid growth of the 
Kenyan economy, have tended to aggravate the 
existing economic inbalance and resultant political 
tensions.
11. Given the short run costs of breakup Uganda clearly 
and Tanzania, almost as clearly, would not have stood 
to gain. Certainly, their rather fragile and sluggish 
domestic- revenue... collection systems were viewed, a s . ~  
being incapable of overcoming the public sector revenue
* •**4* •'effects', meeting new 'capital requirements 'for' deceritra- " "
..-‘-li-sed■.servt<Jes;9.i*and,fcfr|r.ying;on expanding -beveloprrterit ... :;J 
’ * " account programmes at the safne time. ‘This may have been : •"
., / /v.an; underestimate, .of; .the' Tan.zani.an .fiscal-,- capacity ‘ - 19.6.5/74
revenue trends certainly are subject to such a reading. 
However, 1961/64 Actual and 1964/69 Projected revenues 
were much lower and less buoyant.
With the East African Treaty four main changes have taken place 
headquarters shifts, decentralisation, East African Development 
Bank creation, and trade freeing from quantitative barriers within 
the transfer tax framework. Two envisaged areas of change - fiscal 
harmonisation and revised industrial location procedures - have not 
to date achieved fruition.
Headquarters shifts - Harbours to Dar, Posts to Kampala 
(where the newly created EADB is sited) and Community to Arusha - 
have resulted in significant expenditure location shifts in favour 
of Uganda and Tanzania. It is now probable that headquarters 
expenditure (for the Community and Corporations together) is 
approximately proportional to revenue derived from each state 
with a possible small net gain for Tanzania.
The 1974 EAC study on Financial flows in fact supports this 
conclusion. Unfortunately it presents gross interstate and 
external flows in a rather simplistic manner which obscures this 
fact. When account is taken of per cent of facilities used by 
each state and of external payments met from interstate flows, 
Tanzania probably breaks even, Kenya gains, Uganda still has a 
loss on headquarters and related transfer expenditure account.
This is probably the largest single shift in distribution of 
benefits resulting to date from the Treaty.
Decentralisation of services and corporations - excluding 
the headquarters location balancing - has probably not affected 
inter-territorial distribution of gains. Whether it has effected 
net regional gains adversely depends on whether it has improved 
performance since costs have risen. As the EASCO, self contained 
service structure almost certainly was overcentralised and 
decentralisation has been the occasion rather than the real cause 
:of,.many.. o.f the ..cos tv increases,• .jit' i-s‘; doub t fail-. that-: Si gh£f leant -• •
loss of gains from regionalism has, in fact, transpired.
I"’ The' Ea.st Africah Develdpmeht Bank-has to-date pi'ayed a 
•^ lar.ginaL-Tole-'bofh -In respect of.•di^t.rlbutiop of-, gains '.:and- or/.V - , y 
enhancing them. •To 'do the.latter is must attract substantial
soft foreign finance and/or bean effective catalystrfor industries 
possible only on a three country market basis while in respect of 
the former its investment allocation target weighted to Uganda 
and Tanzania can hardly have a major impact until net investment
9in projects which EADB is instrumental in promoting or in 
financing (not simply a contributory lender to) reach - say - 
Shs. 200,000,000 a year. However, as tangible evidence of a 
committment to more territorially balanced and more regional 
market oriented industrial development the EADB is probably 
of a qualitative significance greater than its present quantitative 
weight would suggest.
EADB has taken its role of promoting joint industrial planning 
and or joint industrial ventures seriously. It has produced a well 
articulated bench mark study of East African industrial patterns 
and gaps with numerous pre-feasibility level dentifications of 
areas in which a single plant (or two plants) could serve the 
community market more efficiently than national ones and also of 
possible coordination/specialisation of units within multi-plant 
industries. In the absence of actual state action, these studies 
have not yet had much practical impact.
Trade freeing was, and is, a major success of the Treaty 
arrangements. After falling rapidly from mid 1965 through 1967, 
interterritorial trade recovered and is running above its 1963- 
1965 high point albeit without much evidence of any further rapid 
expansion and without really halting its downward trend as a 
share of total external trade. Tanzanian-Kenyan trade (in both 
directions) has responded particularly strongly. with reductions, 
in percentage and even absolute imbalance flowing almost totally 
from expansion of Tanzanian exports to Kenya and thus indicating 
progress toward balancing by buoyancy not erosion. The growth 
of Tanzania exports included industrial products,e.g. pipes, 
tyres, textiles, and was thus doubly positive in a structural sense. 
Kertya-Uganda1 trade'- has,'behaved"differently..-''Supply “problems v? 
especially in sugar and textiles - have hit Ugandan exports and 
at- the same time interacted with-external. trade, problems -'to 
'cause-a.''sharp- rise ":ih 'imports--f pom Kefiya:.'“- ‘Hei'ther t'he-:export •'. ■* ry- 
nor import results have much relation to EAC.influences. '•
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The transfer tax’s real importance appears to date to be 
serving as a way out of the 1964-67 competitive quantitative 
restriction raising impasse. It may marginally have helped a few 
Tanzanian and Ugandan industries establish themselves and may - 
even more marginally - have harmed a few Kenyan manufacturers, 
but it has not been a major force for change in location of 
specific existing industries.
Assessing the 1964 summary again for 1974 appears to.lead 
to the following tentative conclusions:
1. Overall regional gains are probably slightly higher 
because of expanded joint service and corporation 
activity and shifts in trade flow toward goods to which 
the Common Market is more critical;
2. The corporation and EAC services sector is even more
38clearly than before the main producer of net gains. '
With headquarters balancing and reduction of Tanzanian
39sector deficits (changed to surpluses in the case of 
Harbours>)# Kenya probably remains the largest gainer 
because it is the largest user but the Tanzanian and' 
Ugandan share of net benefits has risen;
3. The industrial goods common market has shifted its 
make up and commodity flow patterns sharply probably 
in a manner increasing present static gains despite 
a lower quantitative level than in 1964. Tanzania’s 
loss from this sector has fairly clearly declined,
Uganda's may have risen at least in the short run. 
Commercial and especially financial services have been 
increasingly territorialised reducing both regional
' ■*> " "• • and transfer gains; • ' >■• . .
4. The agricultural common market has seen a sharp fall 
in sugar and a rise in vegetable oil trade. Uganda -
c j . . s i ^ e - r e a q p n s  v.T.v.now1.pr;Qbably.. gains -1-ess froim-i.t;
and Tanzania more;
• ? * 5 . -'’ Fiscal redistribi-tti6n';-Has'':'endedx • -y ,-r»- ••
• * , % . .  . ■ •* * * #
: 6 ;^' The;.gaip.sr.\,by.. the- •goyerpmpn.troppimuyiity-cpr-ppratipnV' '
; ’ (public")'rsector ■ Seem to have increased'for each-’state; . '
T. •• •/••.'whiT'd'f'ot'V the directly productive; ('now-heavily--paras tat'al • ■
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8 .
9.
10.
. t u #
' l'i..
in Tanzania and more so than in 1964 in Uganda and Kenya) 
changes are less clear - Kenya’s gain and Tanzania’s 
loss seem likely to be smaller but Uganda’s loss larger; 
Kenya clearly remains tha largest relative and absolute 
net gainer and the economy whose industrial sector, 
and balance of payments are mpst dependent- on positive 
development of East African economic regionalism.
However, largely because of headquarters transfers 
(not transfer tax) its absolute gains may well be 
smaller than in 1964;
Uganda’s marginal gain of 1964 has clearly not increased 
significantly - as before any overall quantitative 
assessment would surely yield a result within the 
margin of error of the estimation process;
Tanzania has almost certainly-primarily through 
Headquarters Transfers and increased exports to its 
partners - wiped out its 1964 static loss and- may 
now have a small gain. This is the greatest 
stabilising achievement of the Treaty regime 
as no economic community with a net loser among 
its members can be viewed as having a secure future;
The dynamic gains balance may have shifted with 
Kenya still the largest gainer but Tanzania improving 
its relative share. Certainly Kenyan and Tanzanian 
growth rates for sectors other than agriculture tend 
to be relatively comparable with a Tanzanian percentage 
(not absolute) lead in industry; but Uganda’s appear 
to be rather lower. Indeed it is meeting Ugandan, 
not Tanzanian, minimum gain requirements which could 
pose the greatest future problems here. Future changes 
- both as to net regional gains and distribution - 
are.-likely- ho turn;,an-.what..Qomes..-o.f- continuing efforts 
to devise industrial allocation plan for large units 
either' "requiring "or iriii'ch Tnofe'.eephdmidall'y efficient;'' '' * v ' 
• ' at .prinational., market- . s c a l e ; . . v*. - k U ' k • 
Breakup costs would be.as high or 'higher'today'than in i964, 
"■'.‘with the prbbable-'except.ion .of- the Tanzan’i'ah railway jsystetih 
and still provide a very real incentive for making the' 
Community work.
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A variety of political economic reasons have been advanced as to 
why the East African Community is - supposedly - in danger of 
disintegrating. The resurgence of trade following the coming into 
force of the Treaty and the general resilience of the fabric of 
cooperation and integration over the 1971-1974 period are, in 
themselves, sufficient to cast doubt on any claim that economic 
regionalism in East Africa is crumbling, but some of the specific 
arguments do merit somewhat more detailed attention.
State trading and one channel marketing are asserted to be, 
if not incompatible with the Treaty (which they clearly are not in 
all cases), irreconcilable with a common market. As all three 
partners use institutions and systems of these types to a 
considerable extent (Tanzania did so before the signing of the 
Treaty), this argument is serious, if valid. However, it rests 
either on confusion of free trade in the community sense with an 
unregulated private market system or between the possible and 
actual uses of state trading and confinements. The dominant themes 
of these approaches in Tanzania have turned on furtherance of a 
transistion to Socialism and in Kenya and Uganda on Africanisation 
of commerce plus intervention in specific markets. Obstacles to 
trade and a few cases of overt discrimination have arisen but there, 
is no evidence that any partner is systematically using state 
trading to discriminate against products from the others.^ The 
same holds true of the often related field of •commodity purchase 
credits (aid tied to purchases ranging from'specific commodity 
linkages as in USA PL 480 to fairly general source tying as in the 
local cost covering commodity loan-portion of Chinese finance for 
TAZARA) which were also forseen and provided for in the Treaty 
and which, to date, raise various problems of detail rather than 
atjy, basic, threat, to. East ..African inter.trade.. . .The. succ.es.ful 
elaboration and adoption by the Common Market Council of rules 
-for the ..non-dis criminatory conduct .of State ■ trading ..(non-:.. . . •. :•
discriminatory...that .is vis a.vis ■sources of. supply, in . other ■ partner 
’’states) demonstrates awareness-of • th"e potential"difficulties •' 
inyo-ived.. and the need-.’ ..for’.' a clear reference'.frame-, but-even,'mo re •. .. * . ••«• ***• • . . . . ** .. ’ V.*• ' n ‘ i ••#.«. . *• *. . * ’• • *• * . v ••••*,* * *• » .•'t\ • v • •** . *.'r. '** ••• » . *'* *•' *--»*clearly - it" shows a will' not to Have' altering commercial' sector
VI
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patterns serve as a de facto Common Market dismantling operation.
Slow progress toward fiscal harmonisation falls into two 
parts. On the one hand, the Treaty requirement for arriving at 
an -agreed regional framework for national tax (and implicitly 
related) incentives to producers has not yet been implemented, 
albeit the technical study and preliminary discussion phasesI
are virtually complete. So long as the three states continue 
(whether from commitment to EAC, disinclination to give away
actual of potential revenue, or sheer habit) to operate rather
42conservative incentive policies and to eschew mcompetition" 
for investors, minor differences in national policies and the 
lack of regional frame are fairly minor limitations on present 
levels of integration albeit more serious ones to further 
advances in the industrial coordination field.
The other area of fiscal non-harmonisation, divergent indirect 
tax policies resulting in market price differentials not repre­
senting production cost inequalities, was more serious before 
1973 because of the incentives it provided for smuggling and for 
the use of controls to prevent smuggling which, as unintended but 
at least partially inevitable side effects, create administrative 
and procedural tediousness for legitimate trade. With radically 
unequal market prices resulting from fiscal divergences combined 
with long borders smuggling is inevitable; to control smuggling 
with limited resources necessitates barriers to the free use of 
foreign notes and of ones own notes in other partner states (to 
allow checking the legitimacy of transactions even if all current 
account transactions are automatically cleared for settlement 
over bank accounts once identified). Kenya’s adoption of a 
general sales tax has significantly reduced this branch of •
the problem.
Duplication of industries-most notably recently in the case of 
tyres, - better organised on a -full regional than.a„ limited- national, 
market basis is indeed a threat to economic integration in East 
• Africa, but■more to its- growth.and -contribution o f ‘full potential - .*
gains., than to- .continuation-, of. present patterns of cooperation'... 
and level -'of-benefit's. ’ -Because • of -the-very-large share -'Of- services 
(including• Community-/corporations;) in net gains-and -the addition.5 •- 
'of new trade items '(individually often 'small in'value but
significant as a group) replacing those - ei.g. cement - in whichm c s ^ «
v
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j
new plants in new areas are reducing interterritorial trade, 
there is no reason to assume that failure to agree on regional 
large scale industrial planning and siting coordination will 
cause a rapid erosion of trade or of net gains. However, it will 
limit their growth and could easily lead to the non-renewal of  ^3the Common Market in 1982 when it must be renegotiated or expire.
Runaway increase in EAC spending - which is a first charge on
partner state revenue collected by East African tax departments -
was prior to 1973 a source of considerable national (especially
national Treasury) perturbation. However, it is not an issue
dividing the three partner state among themselves and is one in
which tighter scrutiny of the General Fund estimates was seen
as an easier and more likely,as well as a more efficacious,A4remedy than trying to dismantle joint services. ' The 1972-73 
Estimates and the consultations leading to them marked the 
beginning of a favourable trend in this field;
It is sometimes contended that EAC organs are unable to reach 
decisions rapidly enough to surmount challenges effectively and 
that ultimately this will lead to a sudden collapse or gradual 
gangrenous rotting away of economic regionalism. In its extreme 
form the argument asserts that on a number of occasions key 
decisions - for whatever reasons - piled up until a near crisis 
situation prevailed and were only cleared just in time to avoid 
chaos and too late to avert serious costs and continues that 
presently a situation will arise in whicha last minute solution 
will prove impossible. 'Even granting the description as having 
some elements of truth (it is clearly rather overdrawn) two.points 
can be made: the problem of delayed decisions plagues each
member state as well as EAC and second, experience in clearing 
piled up decisions and issues is at least as likely to lead to more 
speedy future resolution or to continued and growing ability 
to judge when action must be taken to avoid really serious costs 
•of further-'delay..-as-'.t-o. beA'a: prelude'- to:- a debacle*
In its less extreme form, the argument does not maintain that 
a.major breakdown is likely•or’ that issues-vital to-continued 
• flirfctipning'.'ofpresent-:cri'tTcai ' areas wi.1T -'fail'- to •b'e-'r-eachedv';/ ••
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Rather it asserts that because partner states bargain "too well"
- i.e. do not speedily move to possible agreed compromise 
positions which an informed observer, or in some cases even an 
involved participant, could readily identify as the likely final 
outcome almost as soon as the intial negotiating positions were 
known-the flexibility and pace needed to seize new opportunities 
and to adopt changing circumstances is lacking and with the 
result that potential new gains are lost during prolonged negotia­
tions as to how they should be achieved and divided. This, of 
course, is not a breakup but a stagnation/erosion type threat.
It is a real danger, especially in respect of major expansion of 
breadth or depth.
Overly cautious (or suspicious?) bargaining certainly 
exacerbated EAC problems in 1973-74. First, it allowed EAKR to 
play off Tanzania and Kenya blunting the force of the former^ 
efficiency oriented attack by suggesting Tanzania was really 
seeking more top posts. The resulting slippage of time (with 
Tanzania blocking rate increases until reform was begun on the 
grounds the old system would simply waste the money) worsened 
the ultimate extent of the problem revealed in the fall of 1974 
by a preliminary analysis of physical and financial competence 
and capacity. Second, it made one state too cautious, when 
another in 1972 and subsequently suggested a joint official 
technical party to seek agreement on road vehicle loading because 
IBRD - AID and other independent engineering studies suggested 
overloading led to a true cost of the order of $10 -2 0 million 
a year for extra repairs and premature replacement. Had such 
consultations taken place^the 1972 Tanzania draft road user 
weight limitations - not actually put into force until late 
1974 - might have been agreed and the late 1974 Kenya shutting off 
of trade to Tanzania and Zambia averted. Third, a minor EAH 
labour relations mistake (actually not clearly related to 
.■ -citizenship but- bo pr.ocedufes'..for advancement)'.of 1972.was-.. '
allowed to drag on with rising ill will because the two labour 
. 'Ministries were unwilling to knock EAH (the silliest party)' and 
.• .Union-.lhea'ds..together: f o r  fjear-.of, /losing’ fac'e■ .-Thus ,'b.y. late" -19.74 
•' this dispute was much worse and became mixed with the previous 
. ../rp.ad;.t^ fqffiQ; regulations\.b.he4 _f ^ E ’. "•
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A final thesis - related to that immediately preceeding - 
is that the Community will ultimately dissolve or slip into 
innocuous desuetude (or at best a peripheral role) because of 
failure to grasp the point that it must either move forward or 
slide backward. Present joint services will over time become 
less important oi' more appropriate for national operation.
Unless new additions are identified and brought into being, what 
have to date been East African’regionalism’s key sources of net 
gains will be eroded relative to the productive force bases of 
the partner states and possibly absolutely as well. Similarly, 
unless specific attention is paid to creating a regional industrial 
strategy designed to maximise gains from integration and inter­
territorial trade, the importance of Common Market trade (and 
quite possibly its absolute levels) will shrink as national markets 
broaden and national production patterns become more similar.
This line of criticism clearly does have merit. Static 
institutions do tend to fossilize and become peripheral or 
vestigial, an unchanging set of areas of economic co-operation in 
the context of dynamic national economics both growing absolutely 
and developing structurally would', almost certainly lose relevance. 
1965-67 saw a tremendously dynamic reformulation of East African 
economic regionalism in order to surmount a series of key problems 
highlighted, or caused by political economic change. 1968-70 
witnessed the running in and consolidation of the gains encom­
passed in the Treaty and spadework at study and technical consult­
ation level for potential future expansion - of membership, of 
areas for joint decision taking, and of policy harmonisation. 
1971-74 saw several crises surmounted and, with major advances in 
national development strategies and in Southern African liberation, 
a growth in the future potential of broader and deeper co-operation 
but at best peripheral progress on moving toward realising those 
gains. If 1975-77 see several of these come to fruition, the 
"withering away" critics will have been refuted; if not they are 
very likely to be proved right.
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VII
In the context of the preceeding political economic analysis 
of regionalism in East Africa what are priority areas for broadening 
or deepening EAC's scope? Seven have at times been suggested: 
transport and communication, external finance, tourism, agriculture, 
industry, technological services, and expansion of membership.
Transport and communication - at least when abstracted from expansion 
of membership - poses few opportunities for major new gains but may 
be critical for EAC survival. Improved corporation planning and 
co-ordination of road transport policies and interterritorial route 
construction do offer solid - if probably not dramatic - means for 
building on present benefits. Work along these lines is already - 
but somewhat desultorily - in progress; probably the highest 
priorities (and the most urgent) are achieving more effective current 
operation and forward planning of EARC and better co-ordination of 
road use control, especially as to weight limits.
External finance, with the possible exception of soft loans for 
directly productive purposes via EADB or EAC (for on lending to 
corporations), dobs not appear to be a potentially high benefit 
field and would entail substantial costs in agreeing on allocation 
of funds secured. Reconsideration of Corporation external financing 
is, however, a matter of some importance - l \ %  World Bank loans are 
(as the analysis of World Bank economic surveys shows) too expensive 
a basic source in terms of foreign exchange impact. No partner 
state has a mix of foreign finance as "hard" as that of the cor­
porations .
Tourisift may well be a field in which" theoretically achievable gains 
are high. However, in practice it has (and has had, witness previous 
efforts at regionalism) high costs as well. National tourism 
strategies and especially their concept of its role in development, 
differ w i d e l y . F u r t h e r ,  the present imbalance is so great that, 
combined with the divergent.emphases on expansion, it would be .... .. 
likely to preclude agreement on allocation of programme costs or 
identification of territorialprogramme components.. .. Consultative 
•forums for government • and indus.tr.y personnel .on an. Ea.st. African 
■ lfeve-l - might prove.-useful to ekchhnge . views- and’’ da-ta .and. to 'agree'-.', 
on, adhffc- p>a'r a lie 1- courses pf action in specific cases -.i--e ,g... A-.... _••• ;
fegionwide increase'" iri Game' Locige and' 'Park' ''charge's ‘tb non-resident s" • 
would almost certainly prove profitable but is deterred in each
state by fear the others would not follow.
Agriculture may ultimately offer scope for co-ordinated or joint 
action (including much freer trade) than at present. However, in 
the short term, the costs of a common agricultural production policy 
on a broad front appear prohibitive. More detailed examination of 
areas relating to common exports ('whether on promotion, marketing, 
pricing, quotas, market access, negotiation, or storage and 
transport) in which at least co-ordination and possibly joint 
policies or institutions would yield significant benefits seems 
more immediately promising. The EEC Association discussions both 
before and pursuant to the Arusha Convention illustrate the 
potential gains from joint action.
The collapse of the sisal market in 197Cq when first Kenya 
producers and than TASMA dumped stocks, probably illustrates an 
avoidable cost of non-coordination. So may the (on the face of it) 
unreasonable differentials between Nairobi auction and London 
market prices for East African tea.
Pyrethrum is an example of an area dn which co-ordination or 
joint corporate units could be beneficial. Kenya and Tanzania 
produce well over 50% of the world's raw pyrethrum. (A side 
agreement with Rwanda and Burundi could raise the share.) Both have 
now taken over first stage processing and marketing from the former 
MNC owner-manager-marketer. But neither has final stage processing 
plant nor the capacity to identify and promote the new uses the 
ecological emphasis in the West should have opened for pyrethrin 
based insecticides. Joint action could lower processing costs, 
tighten market control, split development cost,, and make agreeing 
with a product development/promotion partner easier and on better 
terms.
Only with more detailed data than are now to hand can a 
priority sequence for action in general and on specific products 
be proposed and discussed with much change of practical decisions 
• resulting. • ~ ••--.*■ •• •
■" fndyistir y ..'is probkbl'.y'' the 'key' atea for the .future ’ of;’the Community.
. ^ •■■•i s dif-f icul-t- t.o-' envi'.s.a-ge. a, ..growing. ^nt.eEti4rrittoriai .
' to international trade ’without major new-'regional market'-oriented 
V  industries- ‘just -as it 'is- di'ff idui'f-'tg. ay'o.id fore seeing, a .slowdown • . 
of industrial progress within a decade, if production remains
concentrated on industries capable of (or forced to) operating
within a single territorial market. However, in the absence of
some agreed basis for industrial allocation to improve upon the
46expired industrial licensing legislation, it is likely that 
industries best served by a single regional plant will be split 
into territorial units producing at a higher unit cost and 
industries which cannot operate territorially will simply not be 
established. The same principle holds for articulated vectoral 
industries e.g. iron ore/coal/limestone - raw steel - steel
rolling - steel sheet/rods - final construction and household/
inputs/engneering - machinery and spares. In many cases the 
location of stages beyond the initial manufactured good (raw 
steel in the case cited) does depend on the presence or absence of 
joint industrial planning and further can be varied a good deal 
in the interest of "balancing" industry packages without maj'or 
real cost escalation.
This is an urgent area because for a joint planning and 
allocation system to be seen to be working it needs to have had up 
to five years of plant operation behind it or a total of eight 
years counting the time gap between the decision to build and 
■production. As the Common Market expires in December 1982 unless 
renegotiated, 1974 was the latest prudent time for having the 
regional industrial planning and allocation machinery in operation 
and failure to be in sight of agreeing on at least the institutional/ 
allocational frame by 1977 could well result in irreversible 
decisions fatal to the EAC. A very considerable amount of detailed 
preparatory work both on machinery for joint decision taking and on 
suitable industries has been done, the present problem appears to 
be for each state to mobilize the time and energy required to bargain 
out an acceptable framework within which to operate a regional large 
scale industrial policy and to achieve a first round "allocation 
package". This area interlocks with expansion of membership as 
present applicants - particularly Zambia - do/and potential ones - 
•e ^ g.,.-.-Mozambique- •-••are. likely-: .to.^ lay- •parrtie.uTar ./en>phq«i-s.;on -arrange-'••• 
ments which would ensure that their economies shared in regional 
industrial expansion.' foil owing* their-' accession' t'o/pr" association
Vvi;thr the -:pre§eri.t'.East./African paxtoer-s « . %-v.' : ’• :i . :-‘v. .' <v .♦ '•' Y . : ;• /.. ■ Av.*' ••• •/
. Additional technological, .services potentia.ls. relate t.o a;.- .. •
■'sufestahtihi extent'' to industry ' but riot’ simply ' to'regional market'
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industries. Serious applied research over a selected range of 
topics and technological applications and technical consultancy 
units capable of handling virtually all projects with a core staff
plus temporary specialist backup are probably beyond the capacity
47of Kenya, Uganda, or Tanzania taken separately. At least in
the, second area, jointly financed'and used operations would be 
possible and viable. However, in both the research and consultancy 
fields, gains are likely to arise only if the regional activity is 
viewed as central with national units integrated with, or comple­
mentary to.an agreed regional plan of action. As supplements to 
national institutions or as operations with only EA Corporation 
and regional market industry customers and consumers, they would 
have very high unit costs and the present situation of heavy, 
expensive, and often ineffective dependence on imported technology 
and consultancy would remain little altered.
Proposals in both of these fields exist, albeit one may wonder 
whether realism as to startup cost may not nave led to unrealistically 
low initial size and scope identification.
Expansion of membership which received relatively massive attention 
at all levels before 1971 evidently could offer significant
regional, present member, and new member (associate) gains. 
Unfortunately because accession or association (especially the 
former) requires parallel decisions on a wide range of issues and 
areas, it is by its nature exceedingly time consuming. As men­
tioned in discussion of industry, if expansion is to go beyond 
relatively marginal preferential trade and research sharing agreements 
it is probably necessary to devise mechanisms to ensure that some 
industrial gains are located in the new members or associates - a' 
result not possible under the presently existing EAC powers and 
mechanisms. • * -• ' '; ■ ' • - *• ■ -
The resurgence of the advance of African liberation in 1974
has radically raised both the potential of,and the need for, EAC 
expansion . Mozambique, Malawi ('assuming’"it tomes to teims' with'
the. implausibility. of remaining-a South African satellite) Botswana . 
Swazi,; Rhodesia (on independence), join Zambia --Burundi' - Rwanda - as ' 
likely po.teh.tial -.full..'.‘or- .’special members'. -'.'Xh'is':'alterS .tW- ebti'ie. 
potential scale. .. The 11 country. group would approach 60 million 
p6'p;u'la;tib'n arid’ ’jSil (biiiioiV -jdihb 'prmduei jeveh-';ex'ciud:irig--the -iessv' 
clearcut possibilities of Somalia, Ethiopia, or Malagasy joining
*-X tv.1" •)** - '■ \ . - •" ■-.... ’ - *  ;.)• A-"- ■ , ‘ ...» **. «*’t. J • •, - * 1
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in the enlarged grouping. On the other hand, the failure to 
capitalise on this opportunity could confront Tanzania with 
membership in a 7 - 9 country group (excluding Kenya - Uganda) 
or the existing 3 country one. In that choice - unlike 1965 
or 1971 - the African unity argument would be two edged not the 
most telling argument for EAC^and a Mozambique - Tanzania - 
Zambia - Rhodesia - Malawi - Botswana - Swazi group with- joint 
industrial planning would be considerably more promising economically 
than a Uganda - Kenya - Tanzania one without. Time is running -
whether toward a major breakthrough or a gradual breakdown remains✓
to be seen. The 1982 Common Market renewal or lapse point is the
symbolic deadline but the basic decisions are more likely to be
48taken by 1980 at the latest.
VIII
In the case of industry and industrial allocation a few more 
comments may be useful:
the greater the potential costs of national versus regional 
market units, the less likely it is that an industry will 
be established without some common industrial planning and 
the easier it should be (in benefit/cost terms) to agree on 
a regional allocation decision;
b. the lower the existing capacity and commitments, the higher 
the net gains and the lower the costs of adopting a regional 
approach broader than marginal rationalisation of product 
lines and marketing patterns among existing units;
c. it is'unrealistic to'assume that national attempts "to'preempt 
industries of the regional market type will generally meet with 
success. Either duplicative plants are likely to be created
or external tariff changes necessary to safeguard the regional 
market will not be available from the non-producing states} 
both results radically lower the net reqional gain available 
for distribution to anybody;
‘dl ' . because the' benefits*'of' a ' regional'market'' (v's a hational j.. ekcee'd 
; •‘■•t.he. -costs- -of 'second.-.best .'•■(no.t .-any,).- sites’ far most •lar.g.e.-.-sca'le...
' industries,' a regionally determined location policy to share 
, ''V ical;ly, 'agreed ...b^ .sis ,is  ^likely '.t<3.*.be..pconbmibaliy.:
viable;
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such a policy requires that once an industry is listed as
regional no partner state seeks or accepts a plant not
allocated to it (an easy condition for any state actually
wishing to implement it, because-given industrial licensing
and incentive procedures-positive action is necessary before
a firm can or will evade location policy). Without .this self
denying rule the system will break down in a way similar to
49the Kampala Agreement new industry allocation scheme.
Special provisions on time limits within which to start an 
allocated plant and on periods after which new plants' (whether 
allocated or not) are to_.be allowed in other states would 
also be needed generally or on an industry by industry basis;
in the case of East Africa, approximate equality of gains and 
of benefit/cost ratios to partners appear to provide the 
sharing principles most likely to prove acceptable for multi­
national market, industries while addition to gross national 
product (value added less depreciation plus purchases of 
non-exportable local inputs) would appear the most critical 
beneG-t ;
allocation must be based on (at least) detailed pre-feasibility 
studies if it is to be effective, otherwise delays and 
cancellations will inevitably bring the system into disrepute;
there is no necessity for each state to weight different types 
of gain e.g. net exports, import savings, job creation, 
linkage impact, value added capital inflow, identically to its 
partners. Indeed if national goal priorities for industry vary 
somewhat, it may be easier to arrive at package d a i s  since 
preferences for particular industries will then vary;
allocation should take place on a package basis - .perhaps 
annually - because without a number of industries and plants 
to allocate the twin aims of approximate equality of gains and 
picking reasonably technically sound locations for each plant 
will not be attainable;
the ultimate decision on the■acceptability of 'any package is a 
political -one.r technical, data and -analysis are means, to .. 
inf ormin’g " that decision and making’it iess l'ikeiy that 'it. wi 1*1 
be regretted later;■• ' . . .
some forum for agreeing approximate prices and pricing policies 
minimum.guaranteed supplies and orders, and - in some cases -
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annual or multiyear contracts will be needed. The twin facts 
that most relevant industries will need tariff concessions 
(upward on their own output and downward on inputs) and that 
price controls to prevent nullifying or exploiting tax changes 
are increasingly used in Kenya and Tanzania provide leverage 
> over(and a basis from which to build,such forums;
1 . joint ownership of allocated industries by the partner states 
could be one way of securing continuing agreed decisions on 
major policies after industry establishment, but it is not the 
only way and may raise difficulties of its own when foreign 
private partners are involved;
m. the technical problems of achieving a workable set of procedures 
and of implementing them in the regional industrial planning 
and allocation field are fairly clearly of a lesser order of 
magnitude than those relating to the Transfer Tax system and 
offer a far higher potential payoff both nationally and, a_ 
fortiori, regionally. Politically too the choice should be 
easier as one is basically allocating potential gains which 
in many cases cannot be achieved at all without agreement 
rather than, as in the Transfer Tax case, potentially reducing 
total regional and national gains.
IX
The general conclusion on the state and prospects of economic 
integration in East Africa must be a qualified but tentatively 
positive one. Gains have been made and maintained; major challenges 
to the continued existence of the system have" been surmounted, 
particular arrangements have been altered when necessary to preserve 
major gains or avoid unacceptable costs.
In 1965 it would have been hard to be as positive. The
EACSO-Self Contained Services system then appeared to be on a road
leading to breakup. In 1968 an evaluation might well have been
more positive,'but this' wouid ' have' stemmed' from somewhat"
unreal euphoria flowing. from the successful restructuring of the .
.fabric of economic regionalism to' surmount the. strains which
' ‘ threatened t° ''.reridVit irl.- ‘ 1967-1976. was- a period., pf.'.cohsdi'idati'na'
gains-, 1971-1974 .has been one of . running. a~ basically unchanged system.V * ‘ • . *•*. • ‘ ’ s -• • - ’ * . . * V
. ■ •,ahd"baTdncihg; ’qtii'te-- m-a-rginalv -l;6 sses -'and gAiftsA'-.'-.-major'-Vsffains vhave' 
arisen in 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974 over interstate political relations,
1 -; ■’ , . v.-v*..-’ * b*-v;. -..'1 i.. b'v; ••••.">.c--''.. ■ •* •••.
<s.
airways, income tax, railways, interstate EAC and Corporation 
transfers, and interstate road transport but none has been such 
as to defy solution: only serious miscalculation by one or more 
states would have allowed any of these to escalate into a breakup 
dynamic. However, the lack of clear gains on new members and 
joint industrial development planning becomes ever more dangerous 
as 1982 approaches; a danger reinforced by the greater potential 
now open to an expanded and deepened EAC acting together with the 
independent states to the south of its present members.->
What is most needed is a sense of direction and a perceptible 
rate of purposive change so that East African and Eastern African 
economic regionalism is, and is generally seen to be, an increasingly 
central theme in national planning, structural change, trade 
development, and industrialisation. Exactly where an institution 
stands at any given moment is often less critical than whence it has 
come and where it is about to be; the theoretical perfection or 
completeness of programmes of change usually matters rather less 
than achieving some minimum mass and rate - so long, of course, as 
the overall thrust of change is in the right direction.
It would be wrong to be unconcernedly optimistic. Tanzania's 
political commitment to East Africa as a step toward African unity 
has never been one of whose wisdom all of its leaders or technical 
officials were convinced. With the alternative potential of 
a Southern looking integration strategy,the apparent consensus to 
accept the quite considerable costs of EAC membership and problem 
resolution procedures might not prove as strong as the 1960-1974 
record would suggest.
Uganda has always been less involved in EAC (as opposed to the 
Kampala - Nairobi - Mombasa transport link) than its two partners.
It is still more peripherally placed in respect of geographic 
(though not functional) expansion. And its political concerns since 
1971 have not centred on EAC so that its lack of firm positions has 
served t9 impede JCenya Ta.nzapj._a bargaining;, on ..new. initiatives ' . 
rather than to serve as a springboard from which to launch compromise 
• o r . .syn-thesis proposals 4 *• ■ •’ " .
. - 'Kenya remains. The '.prispner • erf ‘its••history'; as’ the' -^eoioniale'f a ' s 
near vice regal centre for East Africa. Change is (sometimes rightly 
. see.n. a s.. 'dangerous'. tp‘ Kenyan .:i-nt.qre$ ts- ;and..:T-an.za»ia-R.f$,.'. ge.if -con fide n t 
calls for change believed (usually wrongly) to be callable bluffs or
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ill disguised envy. On the other hand, Kenya does realise EAC's 
demise,and still more the loss of the chance to expand,it would 
have more serious repercussions on its manufacturing present and 
potential than on that either of Tanzania or Uganda and has to 
date always been quite unwilling to carry take it or leave it 
bargaining tactics beyond the point of no return.
In each case there are limits to the costs and compromises 
which will be accepted - in none are these fully clear even to 
that country, much less to its partners. The conditions for 
serious miscalculation do exist. The longer EAC's affairs centre on 
overcoming crisis to hold on to what already exists the higher the 
levels of petty irritation, which can provoke, and the lower the 
glow of joint new achievement, which can prevent, such miscalculation.
The challenge implicit in the potential gains from expanded 
regionalism and the problems in attaining them was clearly posed 
by President Nyerere in his 1967 Cairo Lecture:
the problems which threaten to overwhelm us individually 
become containable in a wider context. The people.of 
Africa are the only justification for African unity and 
they are the only means through which it will be attained.
Africa must be free. And Africa's freedom will come only 
through united action. Any step to unity is a help pro­
vided that the ultimate goal of a united Africa is not 
precluded.
Any step possible in the short and medium term will be 
imperfect and incomplete. Yet, if a growing number of such steps 
are taken, while avoiding dead ends which give limited short term 
gains only at the price of blocking further progress, a genuine 
forward dynamic will be achieved-. Just as designing a cathedral 
or a mosque is more dramatic and faster than building it (and 
requires substantially fewer personnel) so with the designing and 
building of economic regionalism in East Africa, Eastern Africa, 
and Africa. Without the construction, the design remains a dis­
embodied vision; without a careful working out and application of 
feasible (even if 'imperfect) means, ends remain visionary secular 
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24. See Seidman and Green, op cit, Part II; T. Hayter, French 
Aid, Overseas Development Institute, London, 1966; K.
Griffin, op cit, esp. Introduction, Part III.
25. For more detailed studies see K. Widstrand (editor),
Multinational Corporations In African, Scandinavian 
'Institute of African Affairs-, Uppsala, 1975. ' •
26. For a fuller discussion see Seidman and Green, op cit,
Part IV.
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bazaar haggling but to seek to arrive at a package in 
•• ■*'’ "Which'each'.participant ••gains" bn.'the''agreed. i'sSiies.‘taken £'' '
. V -.' .^as--a.-;whQ\le. but-_-n.o;t •ne'c.essarily. ;on,. each;, taken separately'..
'" 'This approach widens the'number'*'of 'particular, areas . knd ';'''
’ • issues' on 'which.'joint- .action can 'be /.taken, by'-waiving, .the.-' .
requirement that each participant come out ahead on each 
item.
Both Community (Hazlewood) and Tanzania (Segal - 
Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam) 
studies and most Kenya manufacturers have concluded the 
direct trade impact of transfer taxes has been low - at 
least compared to prior quantitative restrictions which 
had caused an abnormally low 1966-1967 base. If' that 
is the case, the net direct and indirect effect has been 
highly positive by allowing a dismantling of wider and 
more restrictive controls. ■ /
See R. H. Green, "Economic Independence and Economic 
Co-Operation: A Political Economic Model and Some
Implications" in D. Ghai (ed), op cit.
At that point definitional and assessment problems arise- 
attribution of revenue and routing patterns (and thus 
route revenues) differ under a unified system and may do so 
in ways increasing the apparent Nairobi-Mombasa line 
operating surplus while understating those of the Mwanza- 
Dar es Salaam and/or Kampala-Nairobi lines.
"Territorial Distribution of the Benefits and Costs of 
the East African Common Market" in Federation In East 
Africa, C. Leys and P. Robson, editors, Oxford University, 
Nairobi, 1965.
"Gains and Losses in the East African Common Market",
Yorkshire Bulletin, November,- 1965. 
op cit, loc cit.
"East African Economic Union-An Approximate Balance Sheet", 
Economic Development Research Project Paper 93 > Makerere 
University College, 1966. '(The author- at the time of 
writing that paper was neither an official of nor a 
consultant to tjie Tanzanian Government). -
op cit.
op cit., Chapter 3. (For his analysis of Rhodesias-Nyasaland 
see Chapter 6 .) . _ . .
*A later version of "An Approximate Balance Sheet".’ The 
cojnplete. tabular se-ction- runs- to -28, pages-.^ .largely -c-onsis.ting 
of detailed methodological and source, note's which cannot 
• •be'A:r-eproduc.ed.. here -f o-r. •l’a'dk,:o:f- space. * • / :
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38. Herein lay the basic danger in the Airways and (still far
from resolved) Railways crises. In both cases
horrendously bad management masked by late and poor 
reporting (itself compounded by distinctly inadequate 
external audit reports) threatened to make the corporations
burdens on the partner states. It is notable that the
1968-1972 querying of EAAC affairs and decisions and the 
1972 onward parallel querying of EARR by Tanzanian 
politicians and officials was dominated by financial and 
quality of service (not division of gains or posts) 
concerns and led by the most notably pro EAC individuals. 
Equally, this means that the successful 1972-7*1 turnaround 
of EAAC and the initial steps in 197*1 toward a parallel 
EARR exercise are significant EAC achievements.
39. This does pose a danger in that it removes a negative 
incentive for Tanzania to support the joint framework.
By 197*1 with its probable share of the EARR cash flow 
deficit in the 30-35$ range and alternative maintenance 
facilities at TAZARA, Tanzania could for the first time 
indicate it did not necessarily see division of EARR
as a major financial or physical service disaster. A real 
danger arose at that point that this genuine change of
position would be believed to be a bargaining bluff
leading to a breakdown of EARR reform discussions.
*10. There is reason to believe that the Stamp Report on basic
industry (especially metals - chemicals - fertilizers) 
development and location completed in 1970/71 underlines- 
.. -this problem. . .The -logical way out woul-d probably be to 
broaden the package to include high labour value added, 
low import content engineering industries which could .be . 
located in Uganda without significant costs above those 
at a coastal site.
*11. Indeed Tanzania's State Trading Corporation through 1969
‘ '• :v or-’I‘9 7 0 'tended "to' discriminate in favour' Of’ large
.suppliers .of. name brands .with .strong, .mar.jke ting-qnits-and. 
thus, de facto, 'in. favour of Kenyan and Ugandan s.ubsidiari.es 
’'. ■;’.‘';0f ‘mdj.ibr:.foreign.'concerns;, and against;:‘in.dependeht- Tanzanian- 
producers, -a. perverse f.orm. of _trs.de creation, hy. any. 
kdefinition i v->v: v">- •* - .- 7 ■'— -».*• •••••''
World Bank and International Monetary Fund studies almost 
all comment with some surprise on how few and how limited 
the tax incentives are. They evaluate this situation 
favourably because the evidence that long tax holidays 
and massive raw material duty concessions actually do 
stimulate much additional national product is notably 
thin and dubious.
What expires in December 1982 is not simply the Transfer 
Tax system but the whole of the Common Market provisions.
If no renegotiation is carried out the subsequent position 
would be of three economies with full tariffs against 
each other, not of a totally free customs union/common 
market. The intent - or at least hope - of the Treaty 
clearly is that the provisions will be renegotiated and 
that the post 1982 situation will be at least as free of 
trade barriers as the 1 9 6 7-8 2, but the achievement of that 
intent depends largely on 19 6 7 -8 2 experience.
There is a real danger .in activities (especially in the 
field of research) being approved at Community level 
that would not make their way into any national budget. 
Because Community research is not a direct charge on 
national technical ministry budgets, they operate the 
weaker test "Might this research be of some use?" rather 
than the stronger "Is this of enough priority to use some 
of our limited research allocation on it?"
Kenya sees tourism as a key export sector contributing to 
an export led growth process. Tanzania views tourism as 
a secondary export and, more critical, sees exports as 
a means to meeting foreign exchange needs .of. domestic 
demand led growth.
cf R.H. Green, "Tourism and African Development", African. . .  .. « » i • <
institute of Economic Development and Planning, Dakar,197*1. 
The main (and virtually posthumous) success of the expiring 
East African licensing system was textiles. The 
allccation'vin •thiis' ;case; ultimately did” hefte'fit ^ the'paf trier ’ 
.with the weakest trade balance (Tanzania) most and.the.> 
•intermediate ’ partner (Uganda)' next while concentrating • • •
^.Kenya's-: ■•allocation .'Irr'-.s-yntJie'ti.c^ maniflade;"faeries ’where' •’
its lack of a basic cotton industry did.not pose a cost •
Tanzania is seeking to develop national consultancy 
institutions with some success but probably would still 
prefer the more specialised technological (as opposed to 
technical institutions - Financial - marketing - training 
management) consultancy work handled by a joint corpora­
tion, a route it proposed in 1 9 7 1/7 2 .
This is not to confirm the rather hysterical December 
197^ Nairobi rumours that Tanzania had already decided 
to realign. Its goal as of the end of 197^ was an 
expanded EAC and its aim to avoid the need to choose 
between EAC and a new community. .But the need to choose 
could be forced on Dar es Salaam (or Dodoma).
The Kampala Agreement was not a total failure. Its 
adjustment of existing plant capacities worked out rather 
well. In a certain sense it gave experience in the 
dangers of quantitative restrictions leading to the sub­
stitution of the less corrosive transfer tax in the 
Treaty. Even in respect of new industries, Kenya and 
(partly) Tanzania did establish theirs; only Uganda had 
targeted for a set which proved unattainable. Incomplet 
ness, haste, failure to put institutional forms in place, 
lack of attention to headquarters balance not a basically 
wrong direction seems the better judgement.
Some formula for frequent (not automatic) use could be 
devised along the lines:
a) 60% ownership of equity (20-20-2 0) by partner 
states or their nationally owned development 
corporations;
..b) 31% additional • ownership by bodies-acceptable to
(chosen by) the partner state in which the plant is 
located. (These could be local private, foreign 
private, or parastatal.) 
c) 3% leeway for technical partners, additional
participation by a partner state which is a major . 
supplier or customer, etc.
